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Abstract
This paper considers the AGL literature from a psycholinguistic perspective. It first presents a
taxonomy of the experimental familiarization test procedures used, which is followed by a consid-
eration of shortcomings and potential improvements of the empirical methodology. It then turns to
reconsidering the issue of grammar learning from the point of view of acquiring constraints,
instead of the traditional AGL approach in terms of acquiring sets of rewrite rules. This is, in par-
ticular, a natural way of handling long-distance dependences. The final section addresses an
underdeveloped issue in the AGL literature, namely how to detect latent hierarchical structure in
AGL response patterns.
Keywords: Artificial grammar learning; Text-informant presentation; Implicit priming; Constraint
vs. rule learning; Long-distance dependency; Hierarchy
1. Introductory remarks
The artificial grammar learning (AGL) paradigm has brought together a diverse com-
munity of developmental linguists and psychologists, comparative biologists, cognitive
neuroscientists, and others investigating the acquisition of complex sequential patterns. It
has produced a rich toolkit of experimental paradigms and an equally rich variety of
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theoretical considerations. Still, there exist remarkable gaps and unexplored possibilities
in the AGL literature. The present paper considers some of them from a psycholinguistic
perspective, with its long tradition of creating experimental paradigms for the study of
sequential behavior and its acquisition, and with its traditional involvement with ever
developing linguistic theory and its formal modeling.
We will first consider the dominant empirical paradigm in AGL, the familiarization test
procedure. After presenting a more or less comprehensive taxonomy of the structures
tested by means of this paradigm, I will review a number of its gaps and weaknesses and
provide suggestions for improvement. One of them is a new “implicit priming” procedure,
derived from a long-existing psycholinguistic experimental paradigm by the same name.
We will then turn to the core theoretical issue: What is learned in grammar learning? A
consideration of the much-studied issue of long-distance dependencies invites the theoreti-
cal proposal that what is learned is a set of constraints. Constraint-based approaches are
ubiquitous in linguistics; however, they are all but absent in the AGL literature, which keeps
taking the traditional derivational, re-write grammar approach (explicitly or implicitly).
The final section will take up another psycholinguistic treasure, the detection of latent
hierarchical structure. Fitch’s (2014) proposal that we, humans, are “dendrophiles," loving
tree structures, hierarchical patterning, has met with criticism, for instance by Honing and
Zuidema (2014), who write: “it has proven very difficult to demonstrate true hierarchy at
work in language and music." It is certainly the case that the AGL literature lacks sys-
tematic procedures for detecting latent hierarchical structure in learned patterns. I propose
such a procedure, at least in outline, which has been successfully applied in psycholin-
guistics half a century ago.
2. The two-stage familiarization test paradigm: Taxonomy of structures tested
A substantial majority of AGL studies used some version of the familiarization-test
paradigm. The participant, whether human or animal, is first, in the familiarization phase
presented with an experimental set of sequences. In the following test phase, the partici-
pant’s response to a set of same and/or different test sequences is measured. A large vari-
ety of sequential structures have been tested with this paradigm. Table 1 presents the
types of structure tested.
The first type of structure learning I labeled “rote learning." The subject is familiarized
with a set of strings (such as gan, huf, jom) and subsequently tested for the memory of
these strings. Saffran et al.’s (1996) original statistical learning paradigm was of this
type.
The second type was correctly called “algebraic rule learning” by its inventors Marcus
et al. (1999). Here, the subject is tested on recognizing adjacent or non-adjacent identity
of elements in strings – such as xxy or xyx, where x and y are variables over the total
vocabulary. The tests can run over analogical strings in the same vocabulary, but criti-
cally also in a different vocabulary. One frequent application of algebraic rule learning
was testing the learnability of the smallest possible non-adjacency (of the xyx type).
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If your interest is in the human ability to acquire a grammar and possible precursors
thereof, this otherwise productive rule learning paradigm does not address two central
issues. The first one is “category." The syntax of natural grammars is in terms of syntac-
tic categories, such as noun, verb, adjective, noun phrase, etcetera. It is not over the ter-
minal vocabulary of a language, dog, run, strong.
Luckily, this could be solved by extending the paradigm to strings over categories instead
of terminal elements. I called this algebraic category. One fine example is Seki et al. (2013)
using the categories of male and female motifs in birdsong. Another one is the use of war-
bles vs. rattles by Comins and Gentner (2015) as motif categories. These are, doubtless, nat-
ural categories for the birds concerned. Interestingly, the birds do not acquire an xxy rule
over such categories. It is, of course, possible to check whether a learned rule over cate-
gories can be transferred to a different category. One could for instance train subjects with
syllable strings on the AAB rule and then test them on tone sequences (see Table 1).
An all-important issue is as follows: How are “abstract” syntactic categories acquired
with only terminal, that is, word strings as input? Children receive inputs such as green
ball, big house, dirty mouth; how do they derive from this an Adjective–Noun rule, which
they then apply to new strings such as hot milk? Gerken (this issue) presents a review of
this subject. Reeder et al. (2013), using an AGL paradigm, could show that adults suc-
cessfully derive categories from statistical distributional input properties. But more is
needed to understand the child’s acquisition of linguistic categories, and there is the obvi-
ous question: Are there precursors in the animal kingdom?
The second issue can be called the “generative” one. So far, the tested rules concerned
a small set of very short strings of elements, such as xyx or xxy, or of categories such as
ABA or AAB. But there are no clear limits on the length of sentences that we can produce
or understand. In the tradition of generative grammar this has led to mathematical models
Table 1







Same element strings ‘rote’ abc gan, huf, jom gan, huf, jom
Analogical strings ‘algebraic’ xxy
Same vocabulary gan, gan, jom jom, jom, gan
Different vocabulary gan, gan, jom nem, nem, kov
Analogical category strings ‘algebraic
category’
AAB
Same category m1, m2, f1 m3, m4, f2
Different category ga, ga, jo
Same grammar strings ‘generative’ ab*c gan, huf, jom gan, huf, huf, huf,
jom
AnBn ga, ga, jo, jo
(n=2)
di, di, di, fe, fe, fe
(n=3)
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which do not limit sentence length, such as in the Chomsky hierarchy of grammars. That
these mathematical models generate infinite sets is a mathematical convenience, no more.
There is no empirical fact that languages are infinite sets. Infinity of language is NOT the
thing to be explained.
However, there are empirical facts that can be conveniently modeled by such gram-
mars, for instance, the unlimited use of coordination or of modifiers, as in John is a very
very very nice fellow, which is all easily captured by a finite state grammar which gener-
ates John is a very* nice fellow. Another is recursive self-embedding such as The rat, the
cat, the dog chased, killed, ate the malt. This is nicely handled by context-free grammars.
There are strong claims in the literature that recursive self-embedding is the universal
core property of human language. This in spite of the fact that there are a number of live
and dead languages that do not display it (Pirah~a, Proto-Uralic, Dyirbal, Hixkaryana,
Akkadian - cf. Pullum and Scholz (2010)) and also in spite of the fact that multiple self-
embedding is quite rare in corpora of spoken language (Karlsson, 2007).
The generativity issue is addressed in the fourth type of “generative” studies address-
ing this issue of recursion. Two examples are given. The first one concerns strings of the
type ab*c (or category strings of the type AB*C). An example of such a study is Chen
and ten Cate (2017), to which we will return. The dominant comparison has been
between strings of type AnBn and (AB)n, introduced by Fitch and Hauser (2004). Can ani-
mals go beyond finite state grammars and learn a phrase structure grammar? Experimen-
tally the issue is this: If you get familiarized to short strings of this type, for instance
AABB, will you generalize to longer strings of the same type, such as AAABBB? Are
there precursors in animals or infants of such recursive phrase structure capacity? An
impressive number of experiments have been dedicated to this issue.
3. Some outstanding problems
3.1. Refining the search for learnable string patterns
The strong focus on organisms’ (in)abilities to acquire the recognition of strictly con-
text-free stringsets, such as AnBn, has overshadowed the more basic problem: What are
learnable patterns? Most context-free languages, including the proper subset of regular
languages, are not learnable by humans. Discovering precursors of linguistic abilities in
infants and non-human animals requires a broad, comparative search for what properties
make stringsets learnable. Only a very small selection of stringsets has been systemati-
cally investigated in the AGL literature. Pullum and Rogers (2006) and J€ager and Rogers
(2012), in particular, have pleaded for exploring the learnability of a particular hierarchy
of sub-regular languages. Here, very fine contrasts can be made between levels in the
hierarchy, which are potentially revealing about the organism’s cognitive abilities. At the
bottom of that hierarchy are the so-called strictly local languages. The simplest cases are
bigram languages, specifying which bigrams are permitted in a string. For the stringset
(AB)n, for instance, only AB and BA are permitted bigrams in any string. If a further
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element C is added, the bigram language should specify which of the six possible
bigrams AB, BA, AC, CA, BC, and CB are permitted, etc. The same can be done for tri-
gram languages, and more generally for k-gram languages. The next higher level in the
hierarchy consists of the “locally testable languages." These languages consist of the
strictly local languages, their unions, complements, and intersections. A very simple
bigram example is the language AnBAm. Here AA, AB, and BA are permitted bigrams, but
in addition any string should include precisely one B. This constraint, clearly, is locally
testable. That also holds when the additional constraint is that B occurs at least once, or
at least k times. At higher levels in the hierarchy, additional constraints can be built in,
which allows for quite subtle tests of pattern recognition abilities. In section 4 we will
return to this constraints approach.
3.2. Text versus informant presentation
The exposition procedures used in the familiarization-test paradigm are of two basic
types. Half a century ago, Gold (1967) published his now classical learnability theorems.
They distinguish between two modes of presentation: text and informant presentation. In
text presentation the learner receives a string of legal structures/sentences, that is, positive
cases. In informant presentation the learner receives both positive and negative cases, that
is, also illegal structures that are marked as such. Learnability is, already for mathemati-
cal reasons, deeply different between these two presentation modes. Under Gold’s defini-
tions, text presentation learnability is only guaranteed for finite languages, whereas
informant presentation allows for learnability of finite state and context-free languages
(and for “primitive-recursive” ones; cf. Levelt, 2008).
Both presentation modes have been equally used in animal AGL experiments, but the
informant presentation mode is all but absent in human experimentation. A good example
of the latter is the Geambasu et al. (2017) study. In this xxy/xyx-type rule learning study
in adults, the two presentation modes were systematically compared and they produced
dramatically different results. Informant presentation, that is, with both positive and nega-
tive feedback, not only speeded up learning, but also induced generalization of the rule to
new structures. This confirms the outcome of earlier feedback studies, such as Dale and
Christiansen (2004).
It is, moreover, the case that, in comparative studies, text versus informant presentation
mode is usually confounded with subject population, in particular human versus animal.
This should of course be avoided.
3.3. Testing procedures—off-line and on-line
The “off-line” two-phase paradigm hinges on sustained memory. However, a structure
recognized by the subject during familiarization need not become a structure memorized.
Memory traces may be too short-lived to be picked up in the post hoc tests. In the mod-
ern history of psycholinguistics, off-line testing has been as much as possible replaced by
on-line testing in order to evade such memory problems. You want to observe
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Christiansen and Chater’s (2016) “Now-or-Never” bottleneck at work while it is still on.
Christiansen’s AGL-SRT task (cf. Misyak et al., 2010) has shown to be an effective on-
line learning task. Gervain et al. (2012) demonstrated the power of on-line testing, getting
excellent NIRS results even in sleeping newborns. It opens a window on the dynamics of
learning and on the individual differences thereof.
3.4. An implicit priming proposal
Text versus informant presentation is a way of experimentally manipulating the partici-
pant’s attention. Another way is by priming. Priming became a dominant methodology in
psycholinguistics some 40 years ago. Kay Bock (1986) introduced syntactic priming, which
became an industry ever since (cf. Dell and Ferreira (2016)). Recently, syntactic priming
studies also emerged in AGL. Feher et al. (2016) reported an interactive AGL study, where
they used syntactic priming. Kittredge and Dell (2016) used structural priming in an artificial
phonetic learning study. Priming is an ideal way of affecting the learning process in pre-
cisely defined ways. It works equally well in adults, infants, and I would expect in animals.
Kittredge and Dell also provide a theoretical framework which unifies priming and learning.
Or, in Dell’s own terms: “learning is just priming” (personal communication).
A few decades ago Antje Meyer of my Max Planck Institute proposed the so-called
implicit priming paradigm (Meyer, 1990, 1991), which meanwhile became a classical
method in psycholinguistics. It is possible to apply this method mutatis mutandis to AG
learning. The method is “on-line," doing away with the two-phase familiarization-test
paradigm and its disadvantages. I will present this alternative method by way of the
example in Table 2.
The core idea of implicit priming is that you present the same item in two different
environments, a homogeneous and a heterogeneous one. Homogeneous means that the
item is among like items; heterogeneous, that it is among unlike items. “Like” items can
mean items following the same rule or grammar. For instance, they are all of the xxy type
Table 2
Example of implicit priming paradigm for AGL
Comparison of homogeneous and heterogeneous blocks involving three string types: xxy, xyx, and xyy. The
nine token strings of Hom are the same as the nine token strings of Het.
Homogeneous (Hom) Heterogeneous (Het)
block 1: xxy, xxy, xxy block 1: xxy, xyx, xyy
block 2: xyx, xyx, xyx block 2: xyx, xyy, xxy
block 3: xyy, xyy, xyy block 3: xyy, xxy, xyx
Task: (i) Read visually presented triples (such as gan, gan, jom) and measure speech onset RTs. Or (ii) let
listen to triples and derive ERPs
Presentation: Alternate homogeneous and heterogeneous blocks, for example, Hom1 (3 or 4 repeats), Het1,
Hom2, Het2, Hom3, Het3
Prediction: If rule is “picked up”, responses to the same item in the Hom and Het conditions will be
different
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as in homogeneous block 1, or all of the xyx type as in block 2, or all of the xyy type as
in homogeneous block 3. Now you shuffle the same items around to form three heteroge-
neous blocks, as on the right side in the table. Each item is now among unlike ones.
The procedure is to present alternatingly the homogeneous and the heterogeneous blocks
to your participant, with small pauses between them. (The items in a block may be repeated
any fixed number of times.) The subject must respond to each item. A human participant
may for instance read the item aloud and you measure the speech onset latency. Or the sub-
ject may hear the item (such as gan gan jom) and repeat it and you measure the speech onset
latency. Or the subject hears the item and you measure some ERP response. The prediction
now is that, if a rule is “picked up” by the subject, responses to the same item will be differ-
ent in the Hom and the Het conditions. Notice the power of this technique: You only make
within-item comparisons, that is, the same item in a Hom and a Het condition. You also test
within-participants; they are their own controls. It makes the implicit priming paradigm
extremely sensitive. It is, in our experience, no exception to obtain quite significant 5–
10 ms effects. You can, with enough repeats of items in a block or of blocks, also check
each participant’s individual behavior. Numerous variations on this implicit priming are
possible, which I confidently leave to the distinguished AGL community.
3.5. Comparing dependent variables
There is an abundance of dependent variables used in AGL experiments, among them
preferential looking, grammaticality or familiarity judgments, next item prediction, eye
tracking, EEG, MEG and NIRS measures, and discrimination learning. There is no reason
to expect that these dependent variables measure the same thing. Almost inevitably, com-
parative studies use different dependent measures for the different species used. This is
especially marked in the comparison of human and animal subjects. It would be no lux-
ury to replicate classical findings in a wider range of dependent variables.
3.6. The role of semantics
The child’s acquisition of syntax is not a modular, self-contained phenomenon. It has,
in particular, long been known and shown that there is substantial “semantic bootstrap-
ping” in the acquisition of syntactic categories, such as “verb” and “noun” (Pinker,
1984). See Reeder et al. (2013) and Poletiek and Lai (2012) for reviews of this issue in
the context of AGL. This approach deserves substantial elaboration. It should be entirely
feasible to relate artificial grammars to presented event structures (who-does-what-to-
whom, etc.) and measure their effect on grammar learning.
4. Grammar learning: Acquiring rules or constraints?
The “G” in AGL expresses the central concern: Will grammar G, however simple, be
acquired from some finite set of example strings? Excluding the trivial case where the
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familiarized and tested strings are identical, the “G” implicates some kind of generaliza-
tion: from some finite set of strings to another finite set. The grammar G specifies the set
of strings (the “language”) of which both are subsets. The AGL literature is almost exclu-
sively based on the classical derivational approach to grammar. In this section, we will
further consider the constraint-based approach to grammar, mentioned above, which may
be more congenial to the study of grammar learning than grammars considered as sets of
rewrite rules.
This is easily introduced by considering the issue of long-distance dependency. In the
classical AnBn grammar learning paradigm, the long-distance dependency between the
first A and the last B is the result of recursive self-embedding. The rules S ? ASB and
S ? AB generate the self-embedding phrase structure hierarchy. However, hierarchy is
not a condition for long-distance dependencies in strings.
Consider Fig. 1. It presents quite a simple finite state automaton, which accepts the
regular language {ac*a ᴗ bc*b}. It is fully recursive and displays unlimited long-distance
dependency: If a string begins with a, it should end with a; if it begins with b, it should
end with b. Neither hierarchy building nor recursive self-embedding is at issue here as in
context-free grammars. Long-distance dependency does not at all require pushdown stor-
age.
Still, it is an interesting type of unlimited non-adjacent dependency. Chen and ten Cate
(2017) had the same insight and were the first to test zebra finches’ sensitivity to long-
distance dependencies generated by this type of finite state grammar. They took care that,
different from the Fig. 1 automaton, the dependency was between two non-identical ele-
ments. They tested dependencies over up to three intervening elements. Using a go/no-go
familiarization procedure (i.e., informant presentation), they discovered that their finches









Fig. 1. Finite state automaton long-distance, generating language {ac*a ◡ bc*b}. The language displays
unlimited recursion and unlimited long-distance dependency: Any string beginning with a will also end with
a; any string beginning with b will also end with b.
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This kind of dependency is quite natural in language processing, much more natural
and ubiquitous than self-embedding. It works universally in agreement phenomena. When
you happen to hear a singular subject, the horse, you expect to get a singular main verb,
such as runs. But when the subject is plural, the horses, so will be the verb that is in the
offing: run. In such cases of agreement there is no clear limit on the intervening material.
You just know “some time it will come”—for the listener it is a simple expectation. That,
apparently, has precursors in the animal kingdom.
A natural way of representing an organism’s awareness of dependencies, long or short
distance, is by means of constraints. If the human or animal has captured the dependences
generated by the finite state automaton in Fig. 1, it has acquired a number of constraints:
i. Any string beginning with a will end with a
ii. Any string beginning with b will end with b
A further constraint captures what can happen between beginning and end:
iii. Between beginning and end there are any number of c’s
Constraints have always been around in linguistics. The core of government-binding
theory, for instance, was a set of constraints. Optimality theory is a theory of constraint
ranking. The treatment of phonotactics, in particular, is usually in terms of constraints,
such as the consonantal constraints in Arabic discussed by Adriaans and Kager (2010).
Constraint-based formalisms have become the natural way to handle agreement phenom-
ena, such as number and person agreement between a subject NP and its predicate VP as
in the horses run. The constraint on the unification of the phrases the horse and run is
that they agree in person and number. See Jurafsky and Martin (2008), chapter 16, for a
review of this constrained-based approach to unification.
This alternative constraint-based approach to grammar, the so-called Model Theoretic
Syntax (MTS), has been developed by Rogers (2003) and others; see Pullum (2013) for a
comparison of the two approaches. In the latter paper, Pullum considered the relevance of
MTS for the handling of language acquisition:
MTS fits naturally with a very different view of first language acquisition: incremental
amassing of constraints in a way that facilitates increasingly improved matching with
other speakers. Notice, the constraint system acquired need only be roughly compara-
ble to those of other speakers. No recursive specification of a target set of expressions
must be attained, and there is no necessity for the internal representation of the overall
effect of the assumed constraints to be similar between individuals. Humans are
extraordinarily tolerant of divergence and error, and approximate similarity of observed
consequences will suffice to permit conversation. (Pullum, 2013, p. 510)
What children acquire is, from this perspective, not a set of rewrite rules, but rather a
set of constraints. These are acquired one by one, such increasingly matching the input
they receive from other speakers. At any one stage, the child’s grammar consists of the
acquired constraints, not an acquired set of rewrite rules. The more constraints they
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acquire, the more “grammatical” their language becomes. Grammaticality comes in
degrees.
The acquisition of constraints in humans or animals could be handled as Bayesian sta-
tistical learning. The constraints have priors, initial sensitivities in the infants or baby
birds. The body of evidence, the speech spoken to children, the song listened to by birds,
will increase or decrease the probability of these constraints. Lipkind et al.’s (2013) find-
ings on the acquisition of vocalizations in Bengalese finches and in the babbling of
infants can, I suppose, be put in terms of growing constraints.
In natural language, long-distance dependencies often do involve hierarchies. In the
sentence, The horse which we ride runs the relevant agreement relation is between the
horse and runs, not between the horse and ride. The constraint on their unification spans
the embedded relative clause which we ride. Hierarchical embedding is part and parcel of
natural syntax. Lashley (1951) refocused us on the hierarchical, multilevel organization
of sequential behavior in both humans and animals, our task being in both cases to study
the “syntax of act” (p. 188); see Levelt (2014) for the historical context in which this
paper appeared. However, the search for hierarchy in the sequential behavior of animals
is a challenging endeavor. The AGL literature, in particular, doesn’t provide methodolo-
gies for detecting whether hierarchical patterns have been acquired. Here again, the psy-
cholinguistic literature may provide some help. That is the topic of the next, final section
of this paper.
5. Empirical tests for hierarchical structure
The more general empirical issue is whether the human or animal subject recognizes
or memorizes a particular sequence as hierarchically organized, that is, in phrases and
sub-phrases. Levelt (1969, 2008) developed a procedure for testing whether such is the
case. It was developed for testing syntactic hierarchies, but the algorithm involved is
mathematically general, that is, content-independent. Here I will, for ease of exposition,
discuss the procedure from a syntactic example. Consider the sentence Anne buys cheap
darts (abcd). Do we conceive of this string as hierarchically organized? Fig. 2 represents
two of the five possible binary phrase structures (PS) for this sentence. PS(i) is the lin-
guistically common one: There is the noun phrase (NP) cheap darts, which is embedded
in the verb phrase (VP) buys cheap darts, which is embedded in the sentence (S) Anne
buys cheap darts. But four other binary bracketings are possible, of which PS(ii) is an
example. Is it possible to determine empirically which phrase structure is the correct one
or whether any phrase structure is correct?
It is, but one needs empirical data of a particular kind. Needed is some measure of
pairwise relatedness among the words in the sentence. Intuitively cheap and darts are
stronger related than Anne and cheap. One can ask subjects to rank order such pairs in
terms of relation strength, given the sentence, and they may judge r(cheap, darts) ˃ r
(Anne, cheap) or in short r(c,d) ˃ r(a,c). How can one theoretically relate such data to a
possible phrase structure of the sentence?
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In Levelt (2008, vol. III, section 2.4.2), I proposed to define a “cohesion function” a
over the nodes of phrase structures; see Fig. 3. If phrase B is embedded in phrase A, the
cohesion of the embedded phrase B, a(B), is greater than the cohesion of the embedding
phrase, a(A). In example PS(i), the cohesion of the most embedded phrase cheap darts, a
(cd), is greater than the cohesion of buys cheap darts, a(bcd), which in turn is greater
than a(abcd), the cohesion of the whole sentence.
Now define the “smallest common constituent” (SCC) of two words in the sentence as
the smallest phrase to which they both belong. SCC(cheap, darts) in PS(i) is the noun
phrase cheap darts and SCC(Anne, cheap) is the whole sentence Anne buys cheap darts.
It is now possible to relate relation strength to cohesion as follows: for all words i, j, k, l
in the sentence r(i,j) ˃ r(k,l) ⇔ aSCC(i,j) ˃ aSCC(k,l). In the above example r(c,d) was
judged greater than r(a,c). That agrees with the cohesion a(cd) being greater than the
cohesion a(abcd). Although only inequalities are formulated in the if-and-only-if state-
ment, it follows by exclusion that equal degrees of relatedness go with equal cohesion
values. The relatedness r(Anne, cheap), for instance, is identical to r(Anne, darts) because
they have the same smallest common constituent, namely the whole sentence.
If this is the way pairwise relatedness of words in the sentence is related to hierarchi-
cal phrase structure, a very interesting inequality holds:
1. Ultrametric inequality: r(x,y) ≥ min (r(x,z), r(y,z)), where x, y, z are any words in
the sentence.
Levelt (2008, vol. III, 2.4.2) provides a detailed treatment. The key point is that if a
string is hierarchical, the ultrametric inequality holds among its relatedness values. Also,
the reverse holds: If the relatedness values among elements in a string obey the ultramet-
ric inequality, the string is hierarchical. This was proven by Johnson (1967).





Anna buys cheap darts
PS(ii)
Fig. 2. Two of the five possible phrase structure (PS) trees for the sentence Anna buys cheap darts.








a        b         c        d
increasing cohesion
Fig. 3. Cohesion values a for phrases in phrase diagram PS(i), monotonically increasing from top to bottom.
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Since Johnson’s classical paper a large variety of the “hierarchical clustering algo-
rithms” have been developed (see Blashfield and Aldenderfer (1988) and Yim and Ramd-
een (2015) for reviews). They map a symmetrical relatedness matrix onto some
statistically best-fitting hierarchy or branching tree. For example, if our experiment pro-
vides us with the symmetrical 4 9 4 relatedness matrix for the sentence Anne buys cheap
darts and it meets the ultrametric inequality (within measurement error), Johnson’s algo-
rithm will select the best-fitting phrase diagram in Fig. 2.
The input to any such analysis is a relatedness matrix, containing a measure of relatedness
for any pair of elements in the experimental string or sequence. In the human case, judgmen-
tal scaling data are easily obtained, as in the above example. But that is much harder in the
animal case. Can one conceive of behavioral methods providing measures of pair-wise rela-
tion strength? For the human case, I developed such a behavioral method, which mutatis
mutandis would be applicable in the animal case. Levelt (1970) had 120 participants listen
to sentences disturbed by white noise. After each presentation, they wrote down what they
had heard. For each sentence, a table of conditional probabilities p(j/i) was computed, where
p(j/i) is the probability that word j had been correctly identified, given correct identification
of word i. This was done for all i’s and j’s from the sentence. These data were highly ultra-
metric. Hierarchical cluster analysis of the off-diagonal submatrices for which words i pre-
cede words j revealed the hierarchical structure of major phrases in the experimental
sentences. These hierarchical patterns could have been due to the subjects’ incremental
“chunking” of the input word string, or alternatively to their procedures of retrieving the
string from memory, that is, by phrase and sub-phrase.
Could a similar behavioral measure be developed in the case of songbirds? One won-
derful example in the literature comes quite close. Hultsch and Todt (2004) reported a
study in which common nightingales were tutored on experimental strings of kind-specific
songs. Dependent on the experimental design, a training string would contain some 20–
25 songs that were all different. The duration of such songs is about 3 s. Each song con-
sists of about eight or nine syllables, but the experimental unit was the full song. Eigh-
teen 3- to 7-week-old male nightingales were tutored on these strings. Their first
crystalized songs were recorded some 40 weeks later. It was possible to identify the train-
ing songs in these reproductions, ignoring minor variations. This allowed the authors to
analyze how the reproduced strings related to the tutored strings. One experimental vari-
able was this: Pauses in the training strings had a 4-s duration, but either two or three
longer, 20-s pauses were inserted in the experimental strings. Would this invite the young
nightingale to “chunk” the string in substrings, separated by the longer pauses? That is
indeed what was found. The birds sometimes reproduced the whole string, more often lar-
ger or smaller “packages” of its songs. The partial reproductions were dominantly “coher-
ent” portions from the training substrings, rarely crossing substring (20 s) boundaries. In
other words, the reproductions showed a latent two-level hierarchy. The authors con-
cluded from this experiment and further ones that the observed latent hierarchical struc-
ture results from the birds’ memory storage procedures during tutoring.
The analyses involved computing the frequencies at which song i would be followed by
song j in the birds’ reproductions. This comes close to the analysis in Levelt (1970),
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sketched above. It would indeed be possible to compute the full off-diagonal submatrix of
probabilities p(j/i) of a bird’s producing song j, given that song i had been produced in a par-
ticular song sequence. Such a matrix can be subjected to the same type of hierarchical clus-
ter analysis as used in Levelt (1970). The resulting clusters would reveal the birds’ preferred
“packages” and sub-packages. This would invite experimental designs in which the song
strings presented during the phase of tutoring induce deeper hierarchies.1 The nightingales
might receive high-frequency presentations of different short 2–4 item song packages, less
frequent presentations of particular 2–3 item sequences of these small song packages, and
still less frequent presentations of the full concatenation of the latter larger packages. Would
such a deeper hierarchy show up in the birds’ first crystalized songs?
A quite different procedure for detecting hierarchy in produced sequential patterns
makes use of their temporal structure (cf. Falk & Kello, 2017). It tests in essence the
degree to which a temporal sequence of events follows a Poisson distribution. The more
events “cluster," the larger the deviation from Poisson. This method, however, does not
yield a “best-fitting” hierarchy over the sequence of events.
Note
1. I am grateful to Tecumseh Fitch for thorough discussions of potential experimental
paradigms allowing for the measurement of latent hierarchical structure in birds’
(or other animals’) organization of sequential patterns. The reference to this work
on nightingales is his.
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